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Abstract 
How urban infrastructure is funded, financed, and governed is a central issue for states at the 
national, city-regional and city scales. Urban infrastructure is being financialised by financial and 
state actors and transformed into an asset in the international investment landscape. Local 
governments are being compelled by national states and financial institutions to be more 
entrepreneurial in their infrastructure funding and financing and to reorganise their governance 
arrangements. This paper explains the socially and spatially uneven unfolding and implications of 
urban infrastructure financialisation and local government attempts to implement more 
entrepreneurial practices and governance forms. The empirical focus is the City Deals in the UK: 
a new form of urban governance and infrastructure investment based upon negotiated central-
local government agreements on decentralised powers, responsibilities and resources. The 
continued authority of the highly centralised UK national state, its managerialist institutions, and 
conservative/risk-averse administrative culture have constrained urban infrastructure 
financialisation and entrepreneurial urban governance in the UK City Deals. Situated in their 
particular spatial, temporal, political-economic and institutional settings, financialisation is 
understood as a socially and spatially variegated process and urban governance is interpreted as 
the articulation and mixing of new entrepreneurial and enduring managerialist forms. 
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1. Introduction 
Governing the funding and financing of urban infrastructure is a central concern for states 
across the world at the national, city-regional and city scales. Mounting pressures have been 
constructed by national and local state and financial actors to renew and develop urban 
infrastructures. These stresses include: ageing and physical deterioration of existing assets and 
systems; increasing public and private demands for higher levels of more integrated, 
sophisticated and sustainable services; and, growing expectations of urban infrastructure to 
enhance national economic productivity and competitiveness (OECD 2014, Picot et al. 2015). 
Estimates of infrastructure investment required to enable economic growth globally are huge and 
urban-focused, in some analyses increasing from $2.6 trillion in 2013 to $4.8 trillion by 2030 
(McKinsey & Co. 2013). Following the global financial crisis and Great Recession, the potential 
contributions of urban infrastructure to economic recovery have been rediscovered alongside 
state actor efforts to reduce expenditure and indebtedness under austerity and fiscal 
consolidation (Schäfer and Streeck 2013). 
 
Simultaneously, urban infrastructure has become embroiled in the current episode of 
financialisation (O’Neill 2013). It is being unevenly transformed by financial and state actors 
from a public good into an asset within the international investment landscape (Inderst 2010). 
Existing and new private and/or state actors – including pension, private equity and sovereign 
wealth funds – are incorporating urban infrastructure into their investment portfolios (Thrower 
2017). Instability, volatility, uncertainty, and low interest and growth rates mark the international 
economy following the 2008-09 crisis (IMF 2017). Financial actors have been attracted by 
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infrastructure’s particular economic and investment characteristics: fixed assets providing 
essential collective services with long-term, relatively predictable and stable revenue streams 
capable of supporting high levels of debt, and yielding attractive and less volatile returns 
insulated from swings in business cycles and markets (Brown and Robertson 2014). New and 
reformed existing instruments and governance arrangements have proliferated and been adapted 
by financial and state actors to configure and govern the funding and financing of urban 
infrastructures (see, for example, Peck and Whiteside 2016, Strickland 2016, Ward 2013, Weber 
2010). In the often monopolistic provision of critical services such as energy, transport and 
water, national and local states play multiple roles as customers, guarantors, (co-)investors, 
partners, and/or regulators for investors in urban infrastructure (O’Neill 2017). Local 
governments especially are being drawn into novel, often untried and uncertain, long-term 
relationships and arrangements with financial institutions in the current period of financialisation 
and under conditions of national austerity (see, for example, Ashton et al. 2014, Farmer 2014). 
The substance, pace and ramifications of such changes are revealing gaps in our understanding 
and knowledge. This paper aims to explain the socially and spatially uneven unfolding and 
implications of urban infrastructure financialisation and local state attempts to implement more 
entrepreneurial governance forms.  
 
The empirical focus is the City Deals in the UK. City Deals are a new form of urban governance 
involving infrastructure investments based upon negotiated agreements between central and 
local governments on decentralised powers, responsibilities and resources. City Deals were 
introduced in the UK from 2011 by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition 
government. They were formulated in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis and shaped by the UK 
national government’s public finance deficit reduction priority and ambition for enhanced 
decentralisation to enable cities to boost economic growth and recovery. City Deals involve 
national government in negotiated agreements with over 30 – and rising – city-regional groups of 
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local governments in England, Scotland, Wales, and, in due course, Northern Ireland. UK 
national government actors have used City Deals to incentivise coalitions of local state actors at 
the city-regional scale to develop visions, strategies, and priorities – especially for funding and 
financing urban infrastructure – and reform governance structures to “unlock” city-regional 
growth (Cabinet Office 2011: 1). In the UK and internationally, City Deals are a novel and 
experimental kind of central-local government relation, public policy-making, and urban 
governance. Further, the City Deal concept has been promoted (e.g. Clark and Clark 2014), sold 
(e.g. KPMG 2012), and attracted international interest in Australia, the Netherlands, and the US 
(see, for example, Burton 2016, Katz 2016, KPMG 2014, Prinssen 2016). This first national 
comparative study of the UK City Deals provides a critical case to explain how, why, where, 
when, and for whom the governance of urban infrastructure funding and financing is 
transforming, and to interpret its wider conceptual and theoretical ramifications. The argument is 
that the continued authority of the highly centralised UK national state, its managerialist 
institutions and conservative/risk-averse administrative culture have constrained urban 
infrastructure financialisation and entrepreneurial urban governance in the UK City Deals. 
 
The next section engages critically research on urban infrastructure financialisation and 
governance. It distinguishes funding from financing, identifies characteristics of infrastructure 
financialisation, and introduces a framework to understand the articulation and overlapping of 
existing and established managerialist and new and emergent entrepreneurialist practices and 
techniques governing urban infrastructure funding and financing at the city and city-region scale. 
The following section introduces the City Deals and traces the co-existence and inter-relations of 
entrepreneurial and managerial governance in their origins, anatomy and roll-out across the UK 
since 2011. The next section examines the funding, financing and governance of urban 
infrastructure in the City Deals. It demonstrates the uneven extension and nature of 
infrastructure financialisation and the articulation and overlapping of governance forms with 
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both managerialist and entrepreneurial characteristics. The conclusions summarise the empirical 
findings and draw out their wider conceptual and theoretical contributions. Situated in particular 
geographical and temporal contexts and political-economic and institutional settings, 
financialisation is understood as a socially and spatially variegated process: designed, negotiated 
and managed by multiple actors. Urban governance is conceptualised as the uneven and 
overlapping articulation of emergent entrepreneurial and enduring managerialist forms. 
 
 
2. Financialising urban infrastructure and the articulation of entrepreneurial and 
managerialist urban governance 
Urban infrastructure is a growing focus for financial and local state actors in the contemporary 
period of financialisation (O’Neill 2013). While a contested concept, financialisation refers to the 
“the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005: 3). 
Recent conceptualisations of financialisation have moved on from somewhat all-encompassing 
initial formulations (Thrift and Leyshon 2008). Current thinking works with more measured, 
nuanced conceptions that recognise its social, spatial and institutional constitution, unevenness, 
implications, and limits (Aalbers 2015, Christophers 2015, Keenan 2017, Sawyer 2016). 
Conceptualising a process of financialising urban infrastructure provides a way to grasp the 
uneven and variegated ways in which financialisation unfolds. Financialisation is designed, 
negotiated and managed by multiple financial and state actors in geographical and temporal 
contexts and political-economic and institutional settings (Sawyer 2016, Strickland 2016). 
 
Urban infrastructure is being financialised by financial and state actors for several connected 
reasons. Infrastructure has particular attributes aligned with the demands of financial institutions: 
essential service provision to people and organisations (e.g. physical flows such as broadband, 
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energy and transport and public goods such as education and healthcare); long-term time 
horizons; high capital intensity; stable cash flows and ability to support high debt levels; less 
volatile returns; state involvement either as direct clients (e.g. via fixed-term concessions) or 
proximate to transactions (e.g. via regulatory agencies); natural monopolies (e.g. via network 
characteristics, capital intensity or public policy); and, generally low technological risk (Inderst 
2010). Low growth and interest rates coupled with uncertainty in the wider international 
economy have improved infrastructure’s relative position for investors compared to other assets 
such as bonds, commodities and equities. National and local governments have been searching 
for new ways of funding and financing infrastructure, often involving the private sector, while 
trying to reduce public expenditure and debt. For some, financialisation is transforming urban 
infrastructure from a public good into an alternative asset class for financial actors and states in 
the international investment landscape (Inderst 2010). Others are more cautious because of 
infrastructure’s heterogeneity across different sectors with varying risk, return and maturity 
profiles (Thrower 2017). 
 
Work on urban infrastructure financialisation has revealed the changing long-term ownership 
and control of assets and revenue streams, the shifting relations and dependencies between 
national and local states and private actors, and the ramifications for urban planning and service 
provision (see, for example, Allen and Pryke 2013, Ashton et al. 2014, Farmer 2014). But 
research has only begun explaining how the financialisation of urban infrastructure is unfolding 
in particular national and local contexts, and how it is relating to changes in the governance of 
infrastructure funding and financing (see, for example, Guironnet and Halbert 2014, Halbert and 
Attuyer 2016, O’Neill 2013, Strickland 2016, Weber 2010). 
 
Two contributions are made to this endeavour that respond to calls not to “black box” finance 
in engaging financialisation (Christophers 2015: 191). An important distinction is between the 
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funding and financing of infrastructure. Funding is where the money comes from to pay for the 
infrastructure over time. Funding provides the revenue streams that repay the costs of financing 
(e.g. interest on debt, dividends to equity holders) and meet the up-front costs of infrastructure 
construction (Maxwell-Jackson 2013). Funding is typically from taxes (e.g. general taxation), user 
fees (e.g. tolls on bridges) or other charges (e.g. payments for utility services). Financing is how 
the capital is assembled and structured to enable the investment to proceed; the packaging up of 
infrastructure projects by actors with risk, return and maturity profiles to attract financial 
institutions to provide investment capital (Allen and Pryke 2017). The contemporary problem 
for urban infrastructure is funding and the provision of relatively stable, secure and predictable 
annual cash flows to pay for the costs of financing infrastructure projects (Maxwell-Jackson 
2013). While there exists a surplus of investment capital globally in an era of low interest rates, 
stagnant growth, and uncertainty, financial institutions still seek infrastructure projects structured 
to deliver their desired returns, risks and maturities. Reducing public expenditure and debt under 
austerity, national and local governments are keenly searching for and open to ways to secure 
private sector capital to fill their infrastructure gaps. Reflecting and reproducing infrastructure 
financialisation, such conditions have stimulated innovation in new alongside the persistence and 
adaptation of old funding and financing practices. These range from existing and established 
‘tried-and-tested’ techniques to emergent and newer, innovative practices (Table 1). 
 
  
< insert Table 1 about here > 
 
 
As the process of urban infrastructure financialisation unfolds and extends in geographically and 
temporally differentiated ways across cities internationally, analysis risks getting disoriented in its 
diversity. To assist interpretation for broader understanding and explanation, it is helpful to 
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outline generalizable characteristics to help identify infrastructure financialisation (Table 2). They 
are not a fixed template or rigid check list to enable empirical analysis to conclude whether or 
not certain urban infrastructures are financialised in a cut and dried manner. Given the 
understanding here of financialisation as a variegated and unevenly unfolding process shaped by 
multiple actors, the characteristics provide a heuristic to help discern and explain the extent and 
nature of financialisation in particular empirical cases.    
 
 
< insert Table 2 about here > 
 
 
Urban infrastructure holds a central and longstanding position in urban governance research. 
This is because the local state plays a key role, alongside other actors, in the provision of 
collective consumption goods and infrastructural services to enable economic and social 
activities in urban areas (Hackworth 2002, Jonas et al. 2010). The state retains this integral role in 
infrastructure to underpin capital accumulation due to its large scale, capital investment 
requirements, long-term time horizon, monopoly and competition issues, externalities and other 
market failures – all of which call “for some combination of finance capital and state 
engagements” (Harvey 2012: 12). Urban infrastructure financialisation consequently has 
profound implications for urban governance. Yet, work is only beginning to explain how local 
governments are being drawn into new or changed and long-term relationships with financial 
institutions in urban infrastructure funding and financing, and identifying their implications for 
urban development, governance, and planning (see, for example, Ashton et al. 2014, Farmer 
2013, Weber 2010). 
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An enduringly influential framework connecting the funding, financing, and governance of urban 
infrastructure is Harvey’s (1989) conception of urban governance transformation from 
managerialism to entrepreneurialism. Innovations and experiments propagated by actors in 
contemporary infrastructure financialisation closely intersect notions of entrepreneurial local 
states. Building upon earlier ‘entrepreneurial cities’ ideas (Judd and Ready 1986, Kirlin and 
Marshall 1988), urban entrepreneurialism was defined as a changing governance form distinct 
from the preceding urban managerialism. It was more enterprising, innovative and “speculative 
in execution and design” in its focus upon economic growth and competitiveness (Harvey 1989: 
7). Urban entrepreneurialism was characterised by coalitions and partnerships of public, private 
and civic actors, efforts to secure increased shares of surpluses redistributed from national 
governments, and – significantly given contemporary financialisation – risk absorption and 
speculation by the local state. Urban infrastructure was central to such entrepreneurial 
governance. Land and property were treated as financial assets in this earlier period of 
financialisation. Common consumption-oriented development strategies were pursued (cultural, 
entertainment and retail hubs; convention centres; major event bids; waterfront redevelopment). 
City actors sought to construct distinctive and competitive urban locations and built 
environments attractive to globally mobile businesses and people as well as public sector 
functions.  
 
As the situation from which urban governance was transforming in the post-war period, urban 
managerialism was characterised by the “rationally planned and co-ordinated” provision of urban 
facilities and services (Harvey 1989: 7). Local state agency was primarily engaged in delivery and 
management, and focused upon addressing social need and collective consumption rather than 
economic growth and competitiveness. Urban managerialism was led and orchestrated by the 
state at especially the national as well as the local level, following Keynesian fiscal strategies and 
guided by socially and spatially redistributive principles (O’Neill 2016). Urban infrastructure 
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played an integral role in managerial governance. It provided the physical assets and public goods 
for urban populations such as transport and utilities, and the public capital stock underpinning 
economic activities. Portrayed as the counterpoint to entrepreneurial governance, urban 
managerialism was deemed by implication less enterprising, innovative and speculative. 
Deindustrialisation, tertiarisation, economic crisis, internationalisation, suburbanisation, erosion 
of the urban economic and fiscal base, and rising indebtedness were interpreted as undermining 
urban managerialism. Persistent and recurrent since the early 1970s, transformation towards 
urban entrepreneurialism was generated and accelerated by capital accumulation, circulation and 
intensified inter-urban competition. 
 
While not as pervasive and regularly revisited as urban regime theory (Lauria 1996, Jonas and 
Wilson 1999, Pierre 2014), Harvey’s (1989) “prophetic” (Paddison 2009: 1) thesis endured and 
informed influential work in several areas (McCann 2017). These strands included: the urban 
political economy of neoliberalism and state rescaling (e.g. Brenner 2003, 2004; Hackworth 2002, 
Peck et al. 2013, Raco and Gilliam 2012, Ward 2011); the rise of the ‘entrepreneurial city’ marked 
by speculative economic renewal and heightened socio-spatial inequalities (e.g. Boyle and 
Hughes 1994, Jessop 1997, Leitner 1990, MacLeod 2002); and, recently, the emergence of 
austerity, financialised and speculative urbanisms (e.g. Peck 2012, Peck and Whiteside 2016, 
Davidson and Ward 2014, Ward 2013).  
 
What few critiques emerged pointed to urban entrepreneurialism’s use as a “preface” rather than 
a comprehensive analytical, methodological and explanatory framework (Wood 1998: 120, Hall 
and Hubbard 1996, MacLeod 2002). Voices cautioned against its conception as a template or 
binary transition model between identifiable forms rather than a historical and contradictory 
process with less clear-cut and separable changes (Peck 2014). Critics questioned the 
underplaying of the role and agency of local state actors and the overstating of the capacity of 
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business interests (Valler 1996), and its limiting conceptions of institutional forms centred on the 
local state and/or public-private partnerships (Wood 1998). Challenges were articulated too 
against the idea that over time and space entrepreneurial would eventually eradicate managerial 
governance (Hall and Hubbard 1996). 
 
Further shortfalls in the framework are evident since the 1980s, warranting critical re-
engagement in the current episode of urban infrastructure financialisation. The original thesis 
recognised early on aspects of financialisation that have since accelerated and extended. These 
include the centrality of funding and financing, the risks of the “quagmire of indebtedness”, the 
utilisation of land and property as financial assets, intensified inter-urban competition, and the 
focus upon activities with “the strongest localised capacity to enhance property values, the tax 
base, the local circulation of revenues, and…employment growth” (Harvey 1989: 13, emphasis in 
original). But only in Harvey’s (2015: 177, 178) later work appears recognition of the current 
“special” episode of “global financialisation” and the enhanced “pressure asserted by finance”. 
Important characteristics are identified but not elaborated with clear bearings upon infrastructure 
financialisation and urban governance including: the distinctive character of the “exponential 
growth” (2015: 100) of finance’s sectoral and spatial reach and extension; the “phenomenal 
acceleration” (2015: 178) in the speed of capital circulation and turnover; and, the emergence of 
novel institutional actors, instruments and practices. Contemporary financialisation is interpreted 
as accelerating and deepening the process whereby the use values of fixed capital locked in place 
in urban infrastructure are being transformed into exchange values and rendered liquid and 
mobile by “capitalization” (Harvey 2012: 11). Urban infrastructures are increasingly being 
categorised as financial assets with revenue streams transacted as instruments of speculation by 
financial institutions and local states. This paper addresses the gap by connecting the current 
episode of financialisation to its implications for urban infrastructure funding and financing and 
entrepreneurial and managerial governance forms. Work has begun on this task such as Peck’s 
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(2014: 400) conception of “‘defensive’ entrepreneurialism” arising because “under conditions of 
entrenched financialization, governmental incapacitation, and normalized austerity, a pattern of 
selective risk taking has given way to one of systemic exposure to risk”. 
 
A further shortfall concerns whatever happened to urban managerialism in the wake of this 
governance transformation? Recently, Harvey (2015: 144, 18) emphasised the persistence of 
“increasingly entrepreneurial local state or regional metropolitan apparatuses” and their 
involvement in myriad new and evolving ways to facilitate urban fixed capital formation in 
financialisation especially in austerity where the “fiscal capacities of the state are put to the test”. 
Urban managerialism, though, appears somewhat lost from the picture in recent decades. This 
raises the possibility that it has been eradicated by more entrepreneurial forms (Hall and 
Hubbard 1996). Managerialism seems often consigned to a Keynesian-Fordist past (O’Neill 
2016). Or just used as the situation from which urban governance has transformed as studies 
became pre-occupied with changes over continuities. Research appears dominated by 
comprehending the open-ended and evolving dimensions of urban entrepreneurialism and its 
expansive and varied role for the local state with other actors (see, for example, Clark and Gaile 
1998). Yet, in holding this specific focus for an extended period, the persistence, evolution, and 
mutation of forms of managerialist urban governance have been largely overlooked. The 
potential co-existence, articulation and overlap of both managerialist and entrepreneurial 
governance forms have been relatively neglected.  
 
In the current episode of financialisation, relationships between national and local state and 
financial actors have not only or simply positioned business as dominant and left governments as 
hollowed-out and passive dupes in thrall to financial interests. Indeed, Harvey (1989) 
acknowledged the transformation was contradictory, partial and uneven across a range of 
geographical scales, and marked by risk and uncertainty as local governments speculated on 
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urban investments amidst economic volatility. Gaps are, however, evident in two areas. The 
conception of urban managerialism in Harvey’s (1989) original account is somewhat under-
specified and narrow. It was missing important national and local aspects of the “modern 
infrastructural ideal” (Graham and Marvin 2001: 43) including: direct mostly national 
government roles in planning, funding, financing and delivering infrastructure; the construction 
of centralised, monopolised, standardised and equalised national infrastructure systems; and, the 
demonstration of national state power and geographical widening of social access to services, 
employment, modernisation and societal progress (Graham and Marvin 2001, Helm 2013). Much 
of the research on urban governance transformation has been undertaken in decentralised states 
(e.g. the US, Canada and Australia) (Hackworth 2002, Ward 2011). Mature, centralised states 
such as the UK with established governance systems, central-local relations and public finance 
arrangements require more attention to examine transformations or their absence in the current 
period. Such states provide appropriate experiences for the examination of the relations between 
innovative, experimental entrepreneurialism and customary, traditional managerialism in funding, 
financing, and governing urban infrastructure at the national and local levels.  
 
Urban infrastructure financialisation provides a timely opportunity to investigate its socially and 
spatially uneven unfolding and implications, and to examine local state efforts to implement 
more entrepreneurial practices and governance forms amidst enduring and mutating 
managerialism. Differentiated by the variegations of national political economies and capitalisms 
internationally (Peck and Theodore 2007) and their roles in shaping pathways of financialisation 
(Lai and Daniels 2016), national governments retain pivotal roles in governing urban 
infrastructure funding and financing. Their agency is evident in their relations with local 
governments, and authority over licensing, planning, taxation rights, and the purposes, levels, 
timescales and investments in collective infrastructure provision (Jonas et al. 2010, O’Neill 2013). 
A new framework is proposed to help understand the evolution of urban infrastructure funding, 
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financing, and governance. Existing and established approaches are distinguished from emergent 
and newer ones across key dimensions (Table 3). The framework is offered as an entry point to 
identify and explain characteristic dimensions and how they might be articulating, overlapping 
and hybridising. It is not meant only to provide a means to document a simple, binary and clear-
cut transformation from existing/established managerialism to emergent/new 
entrepreneurialism.   
 
 
< insert Table 3 about here > 
 
 
Researching the UK City Deals 
 
This first national comparative study of thirty-one of the City Deals agreed to date in England, 
Scotland and Wales provides a theoretically-informed assessment of financialisation and national 
and local state actors in funding and financing urban infrastructure. It builds upon existing 
studies of particular City Deals (e.g. Waite et al. 2013, KPMG 2014, Strickland 2016) and specific 
infrastructure funding and financing instruments and practices (e.g. Ward 2011, Strickland 2013, 
Whiteside 2013). The continued agreement of further City Deals in the UK into 2017 presented 
a research challenge to keep up with this policy-in-motion. The methodology, research design 
and empirical data collection strategy was informed by the “distended case approach” (Peck and 
Theodore 2012: 24). This method tries to move beyond the discrete, individual and isolated case 
study. It seeks to understand and explain what is going on over time within and between the 
multiple cases by relating them to each other and situating them within their political-economic 
and institutional contexts. The research activity comprised three connected elements: i) ongoing 
review of secondary sources to supplement and corroborate the primary data (e.g. City Deal 
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proposals and agreements; local government, central government, think-tank, and interest group 
documents; specialist press coverage); ii) a rolling programme of 35 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with key actors representing different public and private institutional interests at 
specific spatial levels started in January 2014 (e.g. elected members and officers in local 
government in cities and city regions; civil servants and advisers from central and devolved 
government, government agencies, interest groups and think-tanks; executives in private sector 
consultancies); and, iii) authors’ participation in public policy consultations, debates and fora (e.g. 
engagement with the UK National Infrastructure Commission; meetings with financial 
institutions; responding to Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly Committee City Deal 
enquiries). Challenges with this approach included situating the City Deals amidst national and 
local political change (e.g. UK General Elections in 2015 and 2017), obtaining details of 
infrastructure funding and financing arrangements, and being unable to undertake evaluation of 
City Deals given their recent introduction and long-term timescales. 
 
Underpinned by the conceptual discussion, the empirical data were analysed along three related 
dimensions. The origins, anatomy and roll-out of the City Deals were established, tracing their 
entrepreneurial and managerialist attributes and evolution. The infrastructure funding and 
financing practices in the City Deals were identified (Table 1). Their characteristics were then 
assessed against the framework of infrastructure financialisation (Table 2). The governance 
forms in the City Deals were determined and related to the funding and financing analysis using 
the framework of existing/established and new/emergent approaches (Table 3). Drawing upon 
the preceding critique, the analysis avoided a strong conception of binary transformation 
between forms of urban infrastructure funding, financing and governance. Instead, underpinned 
by the central argument, the empirical material interpretation sought to understand and explain 
the presence as well as the articulation, overlap, hybridisation and inter-relations of 
existing/established managerialist and newer/emergent entrepreneurialist approaches. The 
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overall aim was to provide a plausible explanatory account of the extent, nature and substance of 
changes in the financialisation and governance of urban infrastructure funding and financing in 
the UK City Deals. 
 
 
3. The City Deals in the UK 
The City Deals are a new form of negotiated agreement between national and local governments 
on decentralised powers, responsibilities and resources. City-regions were identified as integral to 
the UK national government’s economic growth and recovery ambitions following the 2008 
crisis and recession. The city-region scale was prioritised to foster agglomeration economies, 
increase productivity and growth, and support institutional co-ordination and policy intervention 
(Ahrend et al. 2014, Cheshire et al. 2014). While initially England-focused, City Deals were 
formulated as a national policy for:  
 
building a more diverse, even and sustainable economy. As major engines of growth, our 
cities have a crucial role to play. But to unlock their full potential we need a major shift in 
the powers available to local leaders and businesses to drive economic growth. We want 
powerful, innovative cities that are able to shape their economic destinies, boost entire 
regions and get the national economy growing. The aim of these deals is to empower 
cities to forge their own path, to play to their own strengths and to find creative 
solutions to local problems (Nick Clegg, then Deputy Prime Minister, Foreword, Cabinet 
Office 2011: iii). 
 
The city deal-making process involved groups of local governments at the city-region scale being 
invited by national government to articulate, negotiate and agree ‘strategic’ and ‘transformational’ 
propositions and reforms in powers, resources and savings in various policy areas (Table 4). 
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Reflecting its potential contributions to economic growth and historical under-investment in the 
UK, “infrastructure financing was critical to the City Deals. It was consistently top of the 
priorities that the cities identified” (Official, Core Cities, Authors’ Interview, 2014). 
 
 
< Table 4 about here > 
 
 
The origins of the City Deal lie in a Conservative Party critique of New Labour’s ‘top-down’ and 
‘command state’ centralism (Clark and Mather 2003), ‘new public management’ and ‘payment by 
results’ mechanisms (e.g. HM Government 2011), the practices and lexicon of commerce and 
finance, transactional politics in the US, and then Secretary of State for Cities Greg Clark’s 
(1992) PhD thesis on incentive payment systems:  
 
The deal-making approach is in the political DNA of Greg Clark and other coalition 
ministers. It is about offers and making deals…Greg was quite critical of the [New 
Labour] notion of earned autonomy, and didn’t want formal KPIs [Key Performance 
Indicators], but the cities had to give something back for a Deal (Civil Servant, Cities and 
Local Growth Unit, Cabinet Office, Authors’ Interview, 2014). 
 
In addition, the Core Cities – an interest group for the largest urban local governments in 
England outside London plus Cardiff and Glasgow – had long critiqued the UK’s highly 
centralised governance and public finance system as out of line with comparable OECD 
countries (Table 5). Identifying the political opportunity, Core Cities successfully lobbied for an 
amendment to what became the 2011 Localism Act to enable the designation of ‘Urban 
Economic Growth Areas’. In tune with the national austerity strategy and devolved city-region 
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focus, the amendment sought enhanced powers and resources for the largest city-regions to 
increase growth and employment, and reduce welfare spending. What became City Deals sat 
within a political-economic context dominated by the UK government’s fiscal consolidation 
priority. Sub-national development was articulated as particular versions of ‘decentralisation’, 
‘localism’ and ‘rebalancing’ (Pike et al. 2016a). These principles aimed to shift power to local 
communities and business, enable places to tailor approaches to local circumstances, and provide 
incentives for local growth across the UK (Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 2010, 
Cabinet Office 2011). 
 
 
< Table 5 about here > 
 
 
The Core Cities amendment in the 2011 Localism Act provided the legislative basis for the 
‘Wave 1’ City Deals in England (Table 6). Each city-regional grouping put together proposals as 
the basis for bi-lateral negotiations with national government to agree their City Deal. The deal-
making was asymmetrical from the outset in terms of information, knowledge and power: local 
parties did not know what would be accepted in advance; no formal criteria against which to 
assess the proposals were used; and national government retained the authority to agree the deal 
or not. The central quid pro quo comprised enhanced devolved powers, responsibilities and 
resources in return for contributing to local growth, public service delivery reforms, and 
expenditure reductions. Tied to the politics of a new mayoral governance model, Liverpool City 
Council agreed the first City Deal in February 2011, followed by Liverpool City Region and the 
rest of Wave 1. 
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< Table 6 about here > 
 
 
‘Wave 2’ City Deals followed in 2012 following a national government invitation to twenty of the 
next largest cities/city-regions. In contrast to Wave 1 and reflecting the formalisation of the deal-
making process, Wave 2 City Deals included a ‘core package’ of powers to address common 
challenges and a ‘bespoke’ element to reflect particular city issues. Of the twenty cities in Wave 
2, eighteen agreed City Deals in early 2014. The remaining Bournemouth and Poole and Milton 
Keynes City Deals were incorporated into Local Growth Deals agreed with their Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) (Pike et al. 2015). A more open-ended ‘Wave 3’ involved tri-
partite agreements between the UK, local and devolved Welsh and Scottish governments (Waite 
2016). Wave 3 began amidst the politics of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum with the 
Glasgow Clyde Valley City Deal. In later instalments, City Deals have been agreed for Cardiff 
Capital Region, Aberdeen, Inverness/Highlands, Edinburgh and South East Scotland, and 
Swansea Bay. By 2016, thirty-one City Deals had been signed (Figure 1), covering 51% of the 
population, 45% of the Gross Value Added (GVA), 51% of the jobs, and 45% of the enterprises 
in Britain (Figure 2). 
 
 
< Figures 1 and 2 about here > 
 
 
Similarities and differences are evident comparing the City Deals. Wave 1 were pilots with more 
openness to new and previously untested proposals. They were considered more 
“comprehensive” and “ambitious” because the national Cities Policy Unit was “able to get 
greater changes out of departments in those early stages” (Local government officer, Wave 2 
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City Deal, Authors’ Interview, 2014). Wave 2 rolled-out a more formalised and conservative 
approach as “the departments had caught up and were less prone to accept radical change” 
(Local government officer, Wave 2 City Deal, Authors’ Interview, 2014). Wave 3 introduced the 
new dimension of devolved politics, policy and tripartite negotiations (Waite 2016). Wave 1 deals 
were uneven in their engagement with LEPs, whereas Wave 2 deals worked more closely. Wave 
2 proposals were limited and complicated by Local Growth Deals and LEP policy operating with 
different geographies (Marlow 2014). The average number of local governments per deal was 
similar, from 6 in Wave 1, 4 in Wave 2 and just over 5 so far in Wave 3. Wave 1 deals had tightly 
drawn geographical boundaries whereas Wave 2 and 3 deals encompassed wider geographies. 
Waves 1 and 2 incorporated competition and co-operation between local actors but “the 
government did operate a lot of competitive process…which in their view improves quality” 
(Official, Core Cities, Authors’ Interview, 2014). Even once agreed and announced, all three 
Waves of City Deals evolved further as the negotiating loci for local actors shifted from the 
renamed Cities and Local Growth Unit and HM Treasury to government departments and, in 
Wave 3, the devolved governments. 
 
Reflecting the asymmetrical nature of the bargains struck between national and local 
governments, the City Deals are marked by a highly uneven geography of agreed powers, 
flexibilities and funding allocations. These outcomes reflect the imbalances of power between 
the national and local parties, the deal-making process, negotiations between the actors, and 
differentiated local proposals. Given their size and political importance, Wave 1 and 3 City Deals 
generally contained wider packages of devolved powers, responsibilities and resources compared 
to Wave 2 – although Cambridge and Preston were markedly larger given their transport 
infrastructure components. Based on the only publicly available data on funding announced by 
the actors involved in the City Deals, analysis cannot verify whether or not and to what extent 
such funding is actually ‘new’ and additional or re-packaged from existing programmes. Working 
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with this data constraint and with the suspicion that other national programmes in the current 
period are simply re-presenting existing funding commitments (see, for example, Lee (2017) on 
the ‘Northern Powerhouse’), a snapshot of the scale and geographical differences in per capita 
allocations reveals substantial variations. Deals with large infrastructure components in the larger 
city-regions secured the highest funding levels (Figure 3). Given their modest size, levels of 
infrastructure funding in the City Deals were effectively only additional to other funding sources. 
However, the UK government’s fiscal consolidation priority meant: “the net impact of 
reductions in public sector funding far outweigh the positive impact of positive funding coming 
into the city through a City Deal” (Local government officer, Wave 1 City Deal, Authors’ 
Interview, 2014). Transport infrastructure resources agreed in four City Deals have in all but one 
case been exceeded by reductions in the spending power of participant local governments (Table 
7). 
 
 
< Figure 3 and Table 7 about here > 
 
 
City Deals demonstrate the articulation and overlap of entrepreneurial and managerialist 
governance. Entrepreneurial dimensions have been intensified as the City Deals have been key 
elements in the UK government’s ‘spatial liberalism’ (Clark and Cochrane 2013). This approach 
has emphasised enterprise and a more ‘business-like’ and ‘commercial’ outlook for local 
government, ‘innovation’, ‘bespoke’ proposals tailored to local conditions, private sector-led 
growth and engagement (especially via the LEPs), local government funding reduction and 
reform, and – discussed below – some speculative yet circumscribed experiments in 
infrastructure funding and financing (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2010; 
Cabinet Office 2011). Inter-urban competition has been promoted amongst places encouraging 
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use of their “sharp elbows” to secure the most advantageous deals (Local government officers, 
Authors’ Interviews, 2014). 
 
Yet, the City Deals are not only a manifestation of a wholesale transformation towards 
entrepreneurialism and local state dominance by business and especially financial interests. City 
Deals are a centrally-designed and nationally orchestrated policy and governance device used by 
national government to exert tight control, management, and reform with limited devolved 
powers and resources. Reflecting a belief that “cities like the deal-making approach. It gives them 
agency” (Personal communication, Civil Servant, Cities and Local Growth Unit, 2015), national 
government actors have used deal-making to compel local actors, shaping and channelling their 
behaviours in centrally orchestrated directions. Local governments have been engaged in trying 
to construct bespoke strategies and policies tailored to local circumstances, formulating and 
presenting new ideas as ‘innovations’, taking on wider responsibilities and risks, and signing-up 
to medium and long-term delivery and reform commitments under austerity. Deals were only 
secured locally following lengthy and detailed negotiations and when aligned with national 
priorities, policies and positive assessments of their enhanced and ‘transformative’ contributions 
to city-region growth and public expenditure reductions.  
 
‘City dealing’ (Waite 2016) introduces something new in mixing and mutating elements of 
managerialist and entrepreneurial practices. City Deals demonstrate the emergence of ‘informal’ 
governance with decision-making lacking codified protocols and procedures, and the potential of 
being shaped by social relationships, webs of influence and patronage (Ayres 2015). Such new 
policy-making practices are characterised by experimentation, ‘fast discourse’, and the relatively 
rapid brokering of “confidential bargains” (Moran and Williams 2015: 1) between national 
government and multiple local state actors. They favour and narrow involvement down to those 
actors willing and able to cope with limited consultation and deliberation, and “compressed time 
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scales” (Jessop 2008: 194). Such governance differs from the more formalised and structured 
agreements set within clear constitutional frameworks with demarcated separation of powers 
characteristic of managerialism and practised between city, state and national tiers in federal 
systems such as Canada (Donald 2005) and centralised systems such as France (Green and 
Booth 1996). This UK version of city deal-making has emerged and flourished amidst the 
administrative bureaucracy, formalised policymaking protocols, institutional constraints and 
political accountability, and scrutiny characteristic of narrower conceptions of urban 
managerialism (Leonard 1982). 
 
 
4. Funding, financing and governing urban infrastructure in the City Deals 
Across the City Deals, infrastructure financialisation has been uneven and limited, and both 
managerialist and entrepreneurial governance traits have been articulated and mixed. A range of 
infrastructure strategies and initiatives are evident with economic, social and environmental 
purposes, focused upon specific sectors and geographical scales, and involving new, adapted and 
existing funding and financing strategies, instruments and practices (Table 8). Funding and 
financing practices demonstrate elements of financialisation, tempered by centralised national 
control, risk aversion and fiscal consolidation. Some of the larger City Deal groups have engaged 
new financial actors, especially international consultancies, in economic assessment of the 
growth and tax base benefits of infrastructure investment. These appraisal, cost-benefit 
quantification and prioritisation techniques have been used to create ‘objective’ ‘business cases’ 
to ‘pitch’ to national government in the deal-making negotiations. Local actors have made 
substantial claims. In their areas, twelve of the largest City Deals are estimated to generate an 
additional £14.6 billion or 4% of total GVA and over 407,400 jobs or 5.2% of total employment. 
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Compelled by national government and funding reductions, local actors have tried to extend and 
initiate private sector participation in urban infrastructure investment. Private involvement is 
evident in city centre, property and retail-oriented schemes (e.g. ‘Liverpool One’), pension fund 
and insurance fund investments (e.g. Legal and General Insurance Fund, Newcastle), bilateral 
public-private partnerships (e.g. Kier Sheffield LLP), and international investment attraction (e.g. 
prospectus’ targeting sovereign wealth funds in Birmingham). The scale and reach of such efforts 
have been uneven and limited, falling far short of a financialised situation of complete alignment, 
outright control and/or dependence upon private financial actors and markets. This is because 
of differential capacity, conservative attitudes and legal constraints upon risk management and 
speculation in local and national government following negative historical experiences with 
complex financial instruments (Tickell 1998), and the contentious UK histories of privatisation 
and public-private partnerships (Whitfield 2010, Shaoul et al. 2012). 
 
Local actors have proposed new funding and financing instruments involving greater risk and 
reliance upon enhanced urban economic performance and tax base expansion. Most drew upon 
international ‘value capture’ practices (Peterson 2009), adapted to the UK’s centralised 
institutional context. These ‘invest and return’ instruments were based upon: i) prioritising 
investment projects based upon their positive net impacts upon GVA and employment in 
specified geographies (e.g. the city-region or smaller sub-city area); and, ii) sharing the benefits of 
additional growth through locally particular reforms to the central-local fiscal settlement within 
the national public finance system. The ‘earn-back’ model in Greater Manchester, for example, 
sought an agreement with central government to create a 30-year revenue stream by retaining 
locally a share of the additional taxes generated by increased local economic growth. This 
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revenue stream would then be used to borrow against to provide up-front investment in local 
infrastructure to facilitate the increase in economic growth. Any further funds yielded from the 
arrangement would then be ‘recycled’ into further infrastructure investment. Elsewhere, Tax 
Increment Financing-based schemes were agreed in Newcastle, Sheffield and Nottingham, 
allowing borrowing up to £150m for infrastructure investment against the retention for 25 years 
of 100% of business rate income growth above a specified base level. Evident too were 
securitisation and borrowing against existing assets (e.g. via Special Purpose Vehicles in Greater 
Birmingham and Solihull) and/or revenue streams (e.g. user charges such as the River Tyne 
tunnel tolls). Integrated ‘economic and strategic investment funds’ were used to pool and recycle 
funds from multiple sources. These financial vehicles sought to demonstrate ambition, create 
scale, and articulate long-term ‘pipelines’ of ‘investable’ infrastructure projects attractive to 
external public and private investors (e.g. Preston, South Ribble and Lancashire, Leeds City 
Region). While encouraging innovation and competition in the City Deals, national government 
actors were cautious and risk averse in agreeing new instruments, however. After lengthy 
negotiations, several were revised and replaced with more traditional and manageable central to 
local grant transfers (e.g. Greater Cambridge’s ‘gain-share’) or faced limits on their flexibilities 
(e.g. Bristol and the West of England’s ‘Growth Incentive’ business rate retention scheme). In 
Wave 2, new local proposals were even rejected due to their novelty, uncertain risks and 
precedents (e.g. Sunderland City Council’s bid locally to hypothecate or earmark, recycle and 
transfer corporation and other business tax revenues from industrial to city centre sites).  
 
Last, under austerity, reductions in revenue grants from national government, and public finance 
system reforms, local actors sought to adapt existing and new instruments and practices. 
Strategies involved utilising assets, leveraging balance sheets and cash reserves, and generating 
revenue streams to pool investment capital for urban infrastructure. The national Business Rate 
Retention scheme has been used to aggregate business rate revenues for capital investment in the 
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City Deals (e.g. Bristol and West of England, Leeds). New sources of revenue and capital 
funding earmarked for infrastructure include specific proportions of increases in council taxes 
(e.g. Greater Manchester), new taxes (e.g. the workplace parking levy in Nottingham), bond 
issuances (e.g. the ‘Bristol Bond’), and external finance (e.g. European Investment Bank loans). 
Public assets have been assessed for sale, leverage, development and/or minimisation of 
liabilities. Revenue generating assets have been retained and developed rather than sold-off (e.g. 
Bristol Property Board, Birmingham Public Asset Accelerator, Nottingham District Heating 
Company, Newcastle and Manchester Airports) (Cumbers 2012, O’Brien and Pike 2016). 
Increasing local government indebtedness and risk has resulted from close central management 
of the City Deals. HM Treasury’s phased allocation of funding in the City Deals through interim 
‘gateway reviews’ and requirement for balanced annual spending profiles have forced local 
governments to borrow to invest in infrastructure up-front in the expectation of stimulating 
future economic growth and tax revenues to repay the borrowing. This centralised 
administration has displaced the risks of speculative investment and debt repayment from the 
national to the local state. 
 
National finance ministry HM Treasury utilised its dominant role in UK economic policy and 
public financial management, negotiating City Deals to deliver economic growth and public 
expenditure savings. HM Treasury worked closely with the cross-departmental Cities and Local 
Growth Unit to achieve central control in orchestrating, negotiating and rolling-out the City 
Deals under austerity and departmental funding and staff reductions. The Unit provides advice 
to the city-region teams and negotiates the City Deals for national government. It is a new 
institution simultaneously trying to manage centre-local relations, support new ‘investment-led’ 
approaches and techniques, and overcome civil service inertia: “one of the big lessons is co-
design…you need a cities unit working hand in hand with places. Making policy in Whitehall 
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terms is complex, and it fuels the temptation of Whitehall to say no” (Official, Cities and Local 
Growth Unit, Cabinet Office, Authors’ Interview, 2014). 
 
Within the highly centralised UK governance system, central-local and inter-local relations have 
been rescaled to the city-regional level through the City Deals. National government prioritised 
the city-regional scale as ‘functional economic areas’ to exploit the economic potential of under-
bounded city cores (e.g. Bristol, Glasgow, Newcastle and Nottingham), maximise the economic 
growth of wider urban areas, and improve policy co-ordination (Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills 2010). For national government, the City Deal provided a powerful device 
compelling local actors to conform to its preferred model of city-region scale Combined 
Authorities, ideally with directly-elected ‘metro-mayors’ (Tomaney et al. 2017), and business 
involvement through the LEP: “Anybody that doesn’t have a governance structure that will 
make it work isn’t getting a City Deal” (Official, Cities and Local Growth Unit, Authors’ 
Interview, 2014).  
 
Demonstrating the limits of this centralised national managerialism, however, the City Deals did 
not simply enable the top-down imposition of local governance models by national actors. 
Political and institutional geographies, histories and stages of local co-operation, and the agency 
of local actors in the informal deal-making negotiations shaped a range of City Deal governance 
arrangements (Table 9). At the start of Wave 1 and bypassing the need for a referendum, 
Liverpool City Council agreed the first City Deal with a mayor, Mayoral Development 
Corporation, and an additional £75m funding for economic development, employment and 
education projects. Several of the former metropolitan county councils embedded their City 
Deals within new Combined Authorities, although not always with a directly-elected metro-
mayor. Greater Birmingham and Solihull used the existing LEP governance arrangement prior to 
later formation of a Combined Authority and metro-mayor. Other areas have established an 
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Economic Board. Effectively pioneering Wave 3, local actors in Glasgow initiated their City Deal 
negotiations directly with the UK central government and, amidst the politics of the 
independence referendum campaign, agreed the deal and joint committee structure with the UK 
and Scottish governments. 
 
 
< Insert Table 9 about here > 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aimed to explain the socially and spatially uneven unfolding of the financialisation of 
urban infrastructure and local state efforts to construct more entrepreneurial governance forms. 
Through its managerialist institutions and conservative/risk averse administrative culture, the 
highly centralised UK state has exerted continued authority and constrained urban infrastructure 
financialisation and entrepreneurial governance in the City Deals. Analysis demonstrates that 
financial and state actors are extending the financialisation of urban infrastructure and 
introducing governance forms with entrepreneurial characteristics unevenly. New, financialised 
and more speculative relations, strategies, instruments, and practices are evident with socially and 
spatially differentiated and uncertain outcomes. Local government actors are being compelled 
into new risk-sharing relationships and contractual dependencies with national government and 
private actors, increased and higher levels of borrowing, and heightened fiscal reliance upon the 
economic performance and tax base of their city and city-regional economies. Existing and new 
financial actors, including private capital and sovereign wealth funds, are engaging with local 
government in the search for investment opportunities and financial returns from the financing 
and development of urban infrastructure assets and capture of their revenue streams. Wider and 
growing use of new and adapted financial instruments and practices are evident including: 
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investment-based, future-oriented and speculative economic growth strategies; the creation of 
institutional vehicles for larger scale and longer-term investments; and, the securitization and 
borrowing against assets, (future) tax revenues, and national government grants to create current 
fiscal capacity for up-front infrastructure investment and longer term debt repayment from 
expected future growth and financial returns. Local governments have sought to convince 
national government of the merits of their City Deal proposals. More sophisticated economic 
analysis, modelling and forecasting approaches and tools have been developed and often 
purchased by local government from private actors such as international consultancies. These 
techniques involve ex ante appraisals of economic costs (e.g. project finance, debt service for 
borrowing) and benefits (e.g. employment creation, GVA growth, tax base expansion) to enable 
prioritisation of long-term urban infrastructure investments. Local government actors then 
deployed these analyses in ‘business cases’ in attempts to secure additional devolved flexibilities 
from national government, justify the use of new financial instruments, and articulate their 
potential ‘value for money’ and outcomes. Such activities are unevenly transforming urban 
infrastructures from public goods into financial assets, and tying the future fiscal fortunes of 
cities and city-regions more closely to the performance of their urban economy and tax base. 
 
Examination of the City Deals demonstrate too that the financialisation of urban infrastructure 
funding and financing and deployment of entrepreneurial kinds of governance are articulating 
and mixing with established practices and institutional forms. New instruments are being used 
alongside the continued deployment and adaptation of existing instruments, techniques, and 
governance arrangements. Neither a wholesale transformation nor unchecked advance of 
infrastructure financialisation and urban entrepreneurialism are evident. Traditional and tried and 
tested forms of borrowing, debt and grants from national government remain central, albeit 
mobilised in longer-term and more ‘investment-led’ approaches sometimes with new financial 
actors. Local government actors remain constrained and/or reluctant to engage in large-scale 
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forms of financial innovation, risk-taking and experimentation by their knowledge, capacity and 
limited devolved powers and responsibilities in the UK’s centralised governance system. Why are 
local states varying in the extent and nature of their involvement in financialising urban 
infrastructure? Contrasting its more advanced forms in the more decentralised governance 
system in the US (Peck and Whiteside 2016, Strickland 2016, Ward 2011), infrastructure 
financialisation in the City Deals has been limited and attenuated by the highly centralised 
governance and public finance system, managerialist institutions and often conservative/risk 
averse political and public administrative culture in UK national and local government. National 
government’s fiscal consolidation priority and central control precluded stronger fiscal 
decentralisation because of fears concerning limited local knowledge and capacity, financial 
mismanagement and profligacy, unchecked borrowing, and risk taking by local governments. 
Constraints reinforced by the eroded capacity and expertise in national and local government 
following public expenditure reductions under austerity (Pike et al. 2016b); the number of civil 
servants (Full-Time Equivalents) in central government being reduced by 26% since 2006 (NAO 
2017). Different institutional histories and cultures across and within local government too 
influenced attitudes to change, innovation and risk.  
 
Further questioning the “narratives of financialization…as scripts of linear, uninterrupted, 
ineluctable development” (Christophers 2015: 194), the conceptualisation of financialisation here 
is not as a monolithic, over-powering and all-consuming juggernaut rolling into town and 
financialising everything in its path. Financialisation is a socially and spatially variegated process: 
designed, negotiated, managed and regulated by multiple state and private actors in different 
geographical and temporal contexts and political-economic and institutional settings (Sawyer 
2016, Strickland 2016). Neither urban infrastructure nor the local state have become wholly and 
simply financialised. Instead, actors are embroiled in a process in which they are actively 
financialising and being financialised in their relations with other actors in socially and spatially 
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uneven ways. While work has begun (see, for example, Halbert and Attuyer 2016), much further 
conceptual, theoretical and international comparative empirical research needs to investigate how 
urban infrastructure and governance are being financialised in the global North and South. 
 
The UK City Deals reveal the roles of the state in governing urban infrastructure funding and 
financing are not being simply eroded, hollowed-out or undergoing a wholesale transformation 
towards entrepreneurial governance. Instead, dimensions of both entrepreneurial and 
managerialist governance forms are being articulated by local government actors within the UK’s 
highly centralised governance system. Within national and local governments, finance functions 
are ascendant and extended. Local actors are proposing, negotiating and agreeing the City Deals, 
supported by underpinning economic analysis and modelling and the growing but uneven 
involvement of private financial actors. Central-local and city-regional relations are only to a 
degree being shaped by rescaling in the City Deals. This is because of constraints imposed by the 
UK’s centralised governance system, despite devolution and localism rhetoric and incremental 
reforms in England and wider UK devolution. Local government has been afforded highly 
conditional and limited fiscal powers and flexibilities in raising and deploying tax revenues for 
infrastructure in the City Deals. It remains largely funded through multiple and fragmented 
transfers and channels determined and distributed by national government. Horizontal state 
rescaling is evident in the formation of city-regional governance arrangements between local 
government actors in the City Deals but these are under national government purview and 
influence.   
 
Informal deal-making between the centre and the groupings of local governments has been 
prioritised by national government as the mode of engagement and resource allocation. 
Orchestrated and determined by national government actors, this informal governance has 
required narrow and self-selecting groups of local state officials and politicians to present as 
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‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘innovative’ to mobilise, articulate propositions and negotiate. But the 
process and outcomes have been managed and agreed on largely national government terms and 
timetables. The resulting City Deals have turned central-local state relations into tactical and lop-
sided bargains between national and local parties unequally endowed with information, 
knowledge and power. Socially and spatially uneven and uncertain outcomes have resulted. 
Negotiated dialogue between national and local governments enables their representation by 
actors as enhanced local empowerment, innovation, self-help, and reduced reliance on national 
government through more locally-led funding, financing and risk-bearing. Yet, the nature of the 
deal-making has meant the deals have proven difficult to cohere and fix as governance 
arrangements. Local governments have experienced problems including lengthy delays in 
negotiations and failures to agree local propositions, innovative mechanisms morphing into 
conventional grants, and national government departments re-negotiating and even reneging on 
previously agreed Deal elements. Moreover, the closed and opaque character of city deal-making 
raises fundamental accountability, transparency and scrutiny questions (Pike et al. 2016a). 
 
Building upon frameworks articulating transformations between ideal types, the 
conceptualisation of urban governance here acknowledges their heuristic value. But it conceives 
of their co-existence and articulation to allow for blurring, overlap and partial evolutions as well 
as the hybridisation of characteristic forms in particular spatial and temporal settings (Peck 
2014). Deterministic narratives explaining linear, singular and discrete transformations from 
urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism propelled by wholesale financialisation and the 
emasculation of the local state by private financial interests at the behest of national states are 
unconvincing. Processes of change are messy, nuanced and subtle as well as difficult, slow and 
even intractable. The articulation, overlapping and hybridisation of entrepreneurial and 
managerialist governance concepts, strategies, arrangements and practices are the result of 
attempts by actors to financialise and govern urban infrastructure funding and financing. 
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Table 1: Infrastructure funding and financing practices 
Temporality Type Examples 
 
Established, tried-
and-tested 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Newer, 
innovative 
Taxes and 
fees 
Special assessments; user fees and tolls; other taxes 
Grants Grant programmes (e.g. supranational, national, regional, 
city/city-region, local) 
Debt finance General obligation bonds; revenue bonds; conduit bonds; 
national loans funds (e.g. UK Public Works Loan Board) 
Tax 
incentives 
New market, historic and housing tax credits; tax credit 
bonds; property tax relief; Enterprise Zones 
Developer 
fees 
Impact fees; infrastructure levies 
Platforms for 
institutional 
investors 
Pension and insurance infrastructure platforms; state 
infrastructure banks; regional infrastructure companies; 
real estate investment trusts; sovereign wealth funds 
Value capture 
mechanisms 
Tax increment financing; special assessment districts; sales 
tax financing; infrastructure financing districts; community 
facilities districts; accelerated development zones 
Public-private 
partnerships 
Private finance initiatives; build-(own)-operate-(transfer); 
build-lease-transfer; design-build-operate-transfer. 
Asset 
leverage and 
leasing 
mechanisms 
Asset leasing; Institutional leasing; local asset-backed 
vehicles 
Revolving 
infrastructure 
funds 
infrastructure trusts; investment recycling initiatives 
 
Source: Adapted from Strickland (2015: 18) 
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Table 2: Characteristics of infrastructure financialisation 
Growing involvement of financial actors and intermediaries 
 
Increasing exposure of cities to and dependence upon national and international financial 
markets 
 
Increasing use of new and innovative financial practices (e.g. securitization, value capture 
mechanisms – see Table 1) 
 
Utilisation of frameworks of local economic assessment and financial calculation to 
predict, model and speculate against the future 
 
Transformations in the purpose, function, values and objectives of local government and 
their closer alignment with the interests of financial actors and institutions 
 
Increasing public sector indebtedness and risk taking 
 
Transformations in urban infrastructure from a physical and productive public good in the 
urban environment into a financial asset defined by risk, return and maturity 
 
Increasing control over infrastructure by yield-seeking financial actors and institutions 
 
Growing orientation of urban infrastructure to enhance productivity, economic growth 
and competitiveness 
 
Increasing emphasis upon tax base expansion and fiscal reliance upon urban economic 
performance and prosperity 
 
Increasingly geographically uneven capacity to engage in funding and financing urban 
infrastructure 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Strickland (2016: 39) drawing upon Ashton et al. (2014), Farmer 
(2014), Guironnet and Halbert (2014), Halbert and Attuyer (2016), O’Neill (2013), and 
Weber (2010)  
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Table 3: Approaches to governing infrastructure funding and financing at the city and 
city-region scale 
 
Dimension Existing and established 
approaches 
Emergent and new 
approaches 
Rationale(s) Economic efficiency 
Social equity 
Market failure 
Unlocking economic potential 
(e.g. GVA, employment)  
Expanding future revenue 
streams and/or tax base 
Releasing uplift in land values 
Market failure  
Focus Individual infrastructure 
items (e.g. roads, bridges, rail 
lines) 
Infrastructure systems and 
interdependencies (e.g. 
connectivity, 
telecommunications, district 
heating) 
Timescale Short(er) 5-10 years Long(er) to 25-30+ years 
Geography Local government 
administrative area 
‘Functional Economic 
Area’/‘Travel to Work Area’, 
city-region, multiple local 
government areas 
Scale Small, targeted Large, encompassing 
Lead Public sector Public and/or private sectors 
Organisation Projects Programmes 
Funding Grant-based (e.g. from taxes, 
fees and levies) 
Investment-led (e.g. from 
existing assets and revenue 
streams, grants, borrowing) 
Financing Established and tried and 
tested instruments and 
practices (e.g. bonds, 
borrowing) 
Innovative, new and adapted 
instruments and practices 
(e.g. value capture, asset 
leverage and leasing, 
revolving funds) 
Process Formula-driven allocation, 
(re)distributive, closed 
Negotiated, competition-
based, open 
Governance Centralised 
Top-down 
National government and 
single local government-
based 
(De)centralised 
Bottom-up and top-down 
National government and 
multiple local government-
based (e.g. Combined 
Authorities, Joint 
Committees) 
Management and delivery Single local government-
based, arms-length agencies 
and bodies 
 
Multiple local government-
based, joint ventures and new 
vehicles 
 
Source: Authors’ research 
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Table 4: City Deals (Wave 1) programmes  
 
 Skills Housing Investment/ 
Funding 
Transport Low 
Carbon 
IT Business 
Support 
Greater 
Birmingham 
and Solihull 
       
Bristol and 
West of 
England 
       
Greater 
Manchester 
       
Leeds City 
Region 
       
Liverpool 
City Region 
       
Nottingham 
 
       
Newcastle 
 
       
Sheffield 
City Region 
       
 
Source: Adapted from NAO (2015: 16)  
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Table 5: Taxation revenue attributable by government level as % of GDP, 2013 
  
Country Local State/regional 
 
Local and 
state/regional 
Central or 
Federal 
 
Social 
security 
Total 
Canada 2.8 12.1 14.9 12.7 2.9 30.5 
France 5.8 0.0 5.8 15.1 24.0 45.0 
Germany 3.0 8.0 11.0 11.5 13.9 36.5 
Italy 7.1 0.0 7.1 23.6 13.1 43.9 
Spain 3.2 4.5 7.7 13.8 11.1 32.7 
Sweden 15.8 0.0 15.8 21.4 5.5 43.7 
UK 1.6 0.0 1.6 24.9 6.2 32.9 
USA 3.7 5.1 8.8 10.5 6.1 25.4 
OECD 
total 
3.9 4.9 8.8 20.4 8.4 34.2 
 
Source: Calculated from OECD revenue data 
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Table 6: City Deals Waves 1, 2 and 3  
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Greater Birmingham and 
Solihull (GBS) 
Bristol and West of  England 
(BWE) 
Greater Manchester (GM) 
Leeds City Region (LECR) 
Liverpool City Region 
(LVCR) 
Nottingham (NO) 
Newcastle (NCLG) 
Sheffield City Region (SCR) 
Liverpool Mayoral Deal 
Black Country (BC) 
Plymouth (P) 
Brighton and Hove (BH) 
Preston, South Ribble and 
Lancashire (PSRL) 
Greater Cambridge (GC) 
Southampton and 
Portsmouth (SP) 
Coventry and Warwickshire 
(CW) 
Southend (S) 
Hull and Humber (HH) 
Stoke and Staffordshire (SS) 
Greater Ipswich (GI) 
Leicester and Leicestershire 
(LL) 
Sunderland and North East 
(SST) 
Greater Norwich (GN) 
Swindon and Wiltshire (SW) 
Oxford and Central 
Oxfordshire (OCO) 
Tees Valley (TV) 
Thames Valley Berkshire 
(TVB) 
 
Glasgow and Clyde Valley 
(GCV) 
Aberdeen (AB) 
Cardiff Capital Region (CCR) 
Inverness (IV) 
Edinburgh and South East 
Scotland (ESE) 
Swansea Bay (SB) 
 
                               
Source: Own elaboration from Cabinet Office data  
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Table 7: Transport Board Funding and reductions in local government spending power 
 
Local Transport Board* Local major 
transport funding 
per annum (2015/16 
– 2024/25) (£m) 
 
Local government Reduction in 
spending power 
(2014/15 – 2015/16) 
(£m) 
West of England 8.1 Bristol -11.1 
West Yorkshire & York  18.9 Leeds -15.1 
Sheffield City Region 11.3 Sheffield -21.5 
Greater Manchester 20 Manchester -28 
 
* Local Transport Boards, which are comprised of local councillors and are based on city-region 
and LEP geographies, were allocated 10-year funding packages as part of the City Deals in their 
areas.  
Source: Own elaboration from Department for Transport and Department for 
Communities and Local Government data  
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Table 8: Infrastructure funding and financing in the City Deals   
Instrument Example(s) 
Devolved rail and bus commissioning, 
management and regulation 
Greater Manchester; Bristol and West of  
England; Leeds City Region; Sheffield City 
Region 
‘Earn-Back’ invest and return mechanism* Greater Manchester 
Economic and Strategic Infrastructure 
Investment Fund 
All Wave 1 City Deals; Black Country; Greater 
Norwich; Preston, South Ribble and Lancashire 
Flood defences grant funding Greater Brighton 
Housing and buildings (land/property value 
capture) and asset use/recycling 
Preston, South Ribble and Lancashire; Greater 
Birmingham and Solihull; Bristol and West of  
England; Leicester and Leicestershire; Plymouth 
and South West; Southampton and Portsmouth 
Housing, regeneration and buildings 
integrated investment management 
Greater Manchester; Newcastle; Oxford and 
Oxfordshire; Cardiff  Capital Region 
Local Transport Major Funding grant Greater Birmingham and Solihull; Bristol and 
West of  England; Leeds City Region; Sheffield 
City Region; Preston, South Ribble and 
Lancashire 
Long-term grant funding for transport 
infrastructure 
Greater Cambridge; Glasgow Clyde Valley; 
Leeds City Region; Cardiff  Capital Region 
Low Carbon ‘Pioneers’ and Green Energy 
grant funding 
Greater Birmingham and Solihull; Leeds City 
Region; Liverpool City Region; Greater 
Manchester; Newcastle; Nottingham; Hull and 
Humber; Stoke on Trent and Staffordshire; 
Tees Valley 
One-off  Transport Project Funding grant Oxford and Oxfordshire; Aberdeen 
‘Superfast’ Broadband and Digital grant 
funding 
Bristol and West of  England; Greater 
Birmingham and Solihull; Greater Manchester; 
Leeds City Region; Newcastle; Greater 
Brighton; Cardiff  Capital Region; Aberdeen; 
Inverness 
Tax Increment Financing (‘New 
Development Deals’) 
Newcastle; Sheffield City Region; Nottingham 
 
* The original Greater Manchester ‘Earn-back’ mechanism was subsequently replaced by long-
term grant funding of the kind agreed by Greater Cambridge and Glasgow Clyde Valley 
Source: Own elaboration from City Deals and Marlow (2012) 
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Table 9: Governance models in the City Deals 
 
Governance model 
 
Example 
Elected Mayor Liverpool City; Bristol City 
Combined Authority North East Combined Authority; West 
Yorkshire 
Elected ‘metro-mayor’ and Combined 
Authority* 
Greater Manchester; Sheffield City Region; 
Liverpool City Region; Tees Valley; Greater 
Birmingham and Solihull; West of  England 
Joint Committee** Black Country; Coventry and Warwickshire; 
Hull and Humber; Oxford and Oxfordshire; 
Plymouth; Thames Valley Berkshire; Glasgow 
and Clyde Valley; Cardiff  Capital Region; 
Aberdeen; Edinburgh and South East Scotland; 
Swansea Bay 
Single Local Authority Inverness  
LEP or private sector-led 
  
Greater Ipswich; Preston; South Ribble and 
Lancashire; Swindon and Wiltshire 
Economic Board Nottingham; Greater Brighton; Greater 
Cambridge; Greater Norwich; Leicester and 
Leicestershire; Solent; Southend; Stoke-on-
Trent and Staffordshire 
 
*Elections for new ‘metro-mayors’ took place in May 2017, with the exception of Sheffield City 
Region, which is looking to hold elections in 2018.  
**Joint Committees established for City Deals in England are created under the 1972 Local 
Government Act. Joint Committees in Scottish City Region Deals are created under the terms of 
the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973. In Wales, the Local Government Act (1972), Local 
Government (Wales) Act 1994 and the Local Government Act 2000 provide the legislative basis 
for City Deals in Wales to establish Joint Committees.  
Source: Authors’ research   
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Figure 1: City Deal areas (as of June 2016)*  
 
 
* See Table 3 for City Deal areas Source: Own elaboration from Cabinet Office  
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Figure 2: Population and economic ‘footprints’ of the 31 City Deals, 2016 
GVA (£ million)         Population 
 
        Jobs          Enterprises 
 
Source: Own elaboration from ONS, NOMIS and City Deal documents data 
  
675,648, 45%
816,815, 55%
City Deal areas Rest of GB
32,128,398, 
51%
30,622,502, 
49%
City Deal areas Rest of GB
13,968,000 
51%
13,212,000 
49%
City Deal areas Rest of GB
951,860, 
45%
1,149,035, 
55%
City Deal areas Rest of GB
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Figure 3: ‘New funding’ (for all projects) by selected City Deal (£ per capita)* 
 
*Based on data of ‘announced funding’ in City Deals made by Cabinet Office and City Deal 
partnerships and using resident population estimates. 
Source: Own elaboration based on Cabinet Office announcements and City Deal 
agreements 
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